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SEEING IT, KNOWING IT 
Elizabeth M. Glazer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In When Obscenity Discriminates,1 I argued that the First Amend-
ment‘s obscenity doctrine2 has generated discriminatory collateral effects 
against gays and lesbians, and that those collateral effects generate a need to 
refine the obscenity doctrine in light of the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas.3  In his response, If Obscenity Were to Discriminate, 
Professor Barry McDonald agrees with my essay‘s ―core insight—that the 
Miller obscenity test should be applied in a manner that is neutral as to the 
sexual orientation of the pertinent actors,‖4 and notes that this insight ―ap-
pears to have substantial support in basic principles of the Court‘s equal 
protection and First Amendment jurisprudence.‖5  McDonald builds from 
that ―core insight‖ by ―tak[ing] the liberty of recasting these arguments as 
more modest claims that the obscenity doctrine needs to be modified in 
light of Lawrence in order to achieve a principled and coherent constitu-
tional jurisprudence as it relates to the Court‘s treatment of gay sex.‖6  
However, the ―more modest claim[]‖ that McDonald purports to make is, in 
fact, the claim made in my essay, namely, to ―refin[e]—but not over-
turn[]—the obscenity test set forth in Miller‖7 so that it distinguishes be-
tween sex and sexual orientation.  
Thus, despite Professor McDonald‘s perception to the contrary, he and 
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points, however, we do divide, and our division derives from two sources.  
First, and most fundamentally, we disagree about how to measure doctrinal 
effect.  Although McDonald and I agree that the obscenity doctrine should 
not be applied in a way that is biased toward homosexual content, he and I 
part ways on the issue of determining when to measure the effects of a bi-
ased obscenity test.  For McDonald, unless and until the obscenity test is 
applied in a court of law in a biased manner—that is, unless and until a 
work which would not constitute obscenity but for its homosexual content 
is held to be unprotected—the obscenity test has not generated any discri-
minatory effect.8  This source of disagreement is fundamental because it di-
vides McDonald and me on the question of implementation and, ultimately, 
on whether the obscenity doctrine merits refinement.  To McDonald, the 
obscenity doctrine is fine as is unless and until it is misapplied in court; I 
believe, on the other hand, that the doctrine‘s discriminatory effects are in-
herent to the test used and thus the doctrine merits refinement even absent 
―misapplication‖ in court.  Part II of this Reply responds to McDonald‘s ob-
jections that derive from our disagreement on measuring doctrinal effect.   
The second source of our disagreement derives from McDonald‘s and 
my differing views on the impact Lawrence should have on the obscenity 
doctrine.  McDonald objects to the application of Lawrence to the obscenity 
doctrine and also takes issue with my argument that the obscenity doctrine, 
in a post-Lawrence world, violates the First Amendment because the doc-
trine may constitute viewpoint discrimination.  Part III of this Reply re-
sponds to those objections.  
I am grateful to Professor McDonald for providing an opportunity for 
me to clarify these points of disagreement between us and, more generally, 
for answering my invitation to engage in a conversation about connections 
between the obscenity doctrine and the rights of gays and lesbians9 that 
were previously designated ―analytically irrelevant.‖10   
II. MEASURING OBSCENITY‘S EFFECT 
The usual arenas in which advocates have fought for gay and lesbian 
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unconstitutional existence of consensual same-sex sodomy laws,13 involve 
uphill battles that are worth the celebrations that their victories have gener-
ated.14  While overcoming bias against gays and lesbians in these arenas 
should not be downplayed, the exclusion of gays and lesbians in these doc-
trinal settings is transparent—for instance, same-sex sodomy laws before 
Lawrence explicitly prohibited consensual sex between adult members of 
the same sex; marriage in most states is still defined as the union of one 
man and one woman; and federal anti-discrimination statutes, as well as 
those in some states, omit the identity category of sexual orientation.  In 
other doctrinal settings, such as the obscenity doctrine, the exclusion of 
gays and lesbians is less obvious. 
The obscenity test, which derives from the Supreme Court‘s decision 
in Miller v. California,15 aims to provide a principled way to determine 
whether expression qualifies, under the First Amendment, as protected 
speech or unprotected obscenity.16  The Court constructed the test in order 
to refine the standard courts use when drawing the line between protected 
speech and unprotected obscenity.  Before Miller, such a determination was 
left, essentially, to intuition.  Justice Potter Stewart ended his opinion in Ja-
cobellis v. Ohio with a memorable sentence that captures pre-Miller obscen-
ity jurisprudence: ―But I know it when I see [obscenity], and the motion 
picture involved in this case is not that.‖17 
While the Miller test aims to substitute standards for intuition, the test 
leaves to intuition the distinction between content that offends its observer 
because it depicts gay sex and content that does so because it is otherwise 
sexually explicit.  Because at times equally suggestive content is filtered 
differently if it depicts gay sex as opposed to straight sex, I argued in my 
essay that Miller tests offensiveness on a level that, in light of the Court‘s 
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principles.  As a result, the obscenity test folds content related to gays‘ and 
lesbians‘ very identity into a category of speech that the government can re-
gulate without violating the Constitution.  And in a world where those who 
discriminate against gays and lesbians tend to find their coupling—and es-
pecially the explicit details of their copulation—offensive,18 leaving to intui-
tion the determination of whether content strikes one as obscene because it 
contains gay sex seems particularly unrefined.  In order to remedy the doc-
trine‘s discriminatory collateral effects, my essay proposed ―refining—but 
not overturning—the obscenity test set forth in Miller‖ so that it distin-
guishes between sex and sexual orientation.  And while McDonald agrees 
that the doctrine should be refined, he argues that this solution should be 
implemented only ―if the discriminatory application of the obscenity doc-
trine against gay sex portrayals were to become an issue.‖19 
But the obscenity doctrine‘s discriminatory application has already be-
come an issue.  Obscenity trials are, after all, jury trials.  A prosecutor who 
brings an obscenity case wants to win.  It is thus unsurprising that obscenity 
cases often involve depictions of sex likely to make the average juror 
squirm, ultimately causing him to conclude that the material he watched 
was so disgusting that it should be classified as obscene, and that the gov-
ernment‘s regulation of it should not be limited by the protection of the 
First Amendment.  And it is unsurprising that material that tends to have 
this effect on a juror often involves sex between members of the same sex, 
sex among multiple partners, and even interracial sex.  Dr. Paul Abramson, 
a professor of psychology at UCLA who has served on multiple occasions 
as an expert witness in criminal and civil litigations involving sex, recounts 
his experience serving as an expert witness for Knight-Time Entertainment, 
one of the country‘s largest adult video companies, against which the Jus-
tice Department brought suit in 1991.  The United States District Court of 
Northern California issued a search warrant against Knight-Time that con-
tained ―a request for every ‗interracial and all black‘ video.‖20  Knight-Time 
successfully argued on Fourteenth Amendment grounds that the govern-
ment had impermissibly used race as a prosecution strategy, and the videos 
confiscated in connection with its search warrant were dropped from the 
case.  But the government‘s strategy was discernible, as it was when the 
prosecution showed in court My Ass Runneth Over, a gay Knight-Time film 
starring three male actors that ended with a scene involving double penetra-
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volume, in a United States Federal Courtroom to a jury that looked aghast 
and disgusted, particularly by the gay male films.‖21  
Thus, even where its application is clear, the obscenity doctrine‘s issue 
is the doctrine itself.  A potential claimant wishing to argue in court that his 
work was classified as obscene on the basis of its homosexual content 
would be told—and told correctly—that because the obscenity doctrine 
does not distinguish between sex and sexual orientation, his work can be 
classified obscene on that basis.  The potential claimant might even be told, 
moreover, that his work could be classified as obscene because of its por-
trayal of sexual orientation.  As a result, cases addressing specifically 
whether an obscenity determination hinged on a work‘s homosexual nature 
do not exist.  In addition, because there is no real fear of overstepping First 
Amendment bounds, major media filters such as Google and the Motion 
Picture Association of America (―MPAA‖) can filter content of a homosex-
ual nature more strictly than equally explicit heterosexual content.  
Even while the source of the obscenity doctrine‘s discrimination 
against gays and lesbians may be less transparent than, say, a statute that 
bans same-sex sodomy, the discrimination that results from the doctrine is 
clear.  For example, while it is now clear that the law cannot discriminate 
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples with respect to private copula-
tion, the current obscenity doctrine still discriminates between media por-
trayals of these respective acts.  Despite this discrimination, McDonald 
takes the view that refining the obscenity doctrine should occur only in the 
subjunctive.  My view is that the obscenity doctrine is harmful before a 
court decides on which basis a work was classified—because of sexual con-
tent or because of homosexual content.  Because McDonald‘s view of the 
obscenity doctrine‘s impact depends upon its traditional enforcement in a 
court of law, he objects to my essay‘s focus on the actions of Google and 
the MPAA—neither is a state actor.  I address this objection in Part II.A, 
below.  His view on how to measure doctrinal effect also grounds his criti-
cism of my essay‘s empirical evidence—evidence which the essay openly 
concedes to be nothing more than ―the requisite first steps toward the col-
lection of [statistical] . . . data,‖22 and which my essay disclaims is not dis-
positive evidence of the obscenity doctrine‘s discriminatory collateral 
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A. State Actors and Collateral Effects 
Nicole Wong is not a state actor.  Wong is the deputy general counsel 
of Google.24  Google, of course, is ―the most powerful and protean‖ of the 
Internet‘s search engines, reported to dominate the online search market.25  
Internet search engines are the Internet‘s ―librarians, . . . [its] messen-
gers, . . . [its] inventors, . . .  [and its] spies.‖26  Increasingly, users rely on 
search engines to find information on the Internet.27  And the Internet is 
where a large and growing number of people find much of their informa-
tion.28   
Accordingly, despite the fact that Nicole Wong does not act on behalf 
of the state as a formal matter, because of a combination of Google‘s ubiq-
uity and its role in determining, while making sure to comply with the First 
Amendment‘s categories of protected and unprotected expression, the con-
tent that a typical end-user will be able to access, in effect, she does.  She 
and her colleagues at Google have been said to have ―near-sovereign discre-
tion‖ over, for example, the thirteen hours of content uploaded each minute 
to YouTube,29 a Google-owned website through which users can watch and 
share original videos online. Wong, whose colleagues call her ―the Decid-
er,‖ has been tasked with determining what controversial material appears 
(or does not appear) in search results generated by Google, as well as 
whether the user-generated content uploaded to Google‘s various websites 
stays or goes.30  For example, when the Turkish government blocked access 
to YouTube in Turkey because the website hosted videos that the govern-
ment ―claimed insulted [Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of modern Tur-
key] or ‗Turkishness,‘‖ Wong was the one who ultimately decided to which 
videos YouTube would block access in Turkey.31  Among the videos 
blocked was a parody newscast reporting on the homosexuality of Ataturk.  
Wong was the one who negotiated, ultimately unsuccessfully, with Turkish 
authorities about whether to block worldwide access to anti-Turkish con-
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Turkish government blocked access to YouTube in Turkey, a block still in 
effect.32   
As a result of their decisionmaking power, ―Wong and her colleagues 
arguably have more influence over the contours of online expression than 
anyone else on the planet.‖33  A bipartisan bill has been introduced in the 
House of Representatives that would require Internet companies to disclose 
to an office within the State Department ―all material filtered in response to 
demands by foreign governments.‖34  The Global Online Freedom Act (the 
―Bill‖)35 has not yet been enacted, and Google, among others, has sought 
modifications to the Bill, arguing that it would not allow Internet companies 
the flexibility to negotiate with repressive foreign governments.  Seeking an 
alternative to government regulation, these companies have been working 
with other Internet companies and human rights and civil-liberties advocacy 
groups to create voluntary standards that would address international cen-
sorship requests.36  These efforts, and the existence of groups like the Glob-
al Network Initiative,37 ―a multi-stakeholder group of companies, civil so-
society organizations . . . , investors and academics [working together] to 
protect and advance freedom of expression and privacy in the [Information 
& Communications Technology] sector,‖38 suggest that private actors like 
Wong are likely to continue to have control over online content for some 
time to come. 
Because the obscenity test set forth in Miller has fallen into desuetude39 
and the reach of the First Amendment‘s protection cannot be understood 
fully by analyzing court decisions,40 my essay did not analyze judicial deci-
sions invoking the obscenity doctrine, but instead examined other decisions 
that determined what content should be filtered on account of its obscenity.  
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images of homosexual content that contain as much nudity as images of he-
terosexual content, the essay analyzed the MPAA‘s tendency to rate homo-
sexual content in films more harshly than equally suggestive heterosexual 
content.41  After all, Google is not the only private actor whose actions seem 
more like those of the state than those of a private individual.  Because the 
MPAA plays a ―dominant and preemptive role‖ in the film industry,42 a 
New York trial court admonished the MPAA to ―strongly consider some 
changes in its methods of operations to properly perform its stated mis-
sion.‖43  Otherwise, the court warned, ―the MPAA may find its rating sys-
tem subject to viable legal challenge by those groups adversely affected,‖ 
namely filmmakers whose films are given a rating of ―X,‖ a rating that the 
court referred to as ―stigmatizing.‖44 
Neither Google nor the MPAA is a state actor.  My essay engaged with 
the obscenity doctrine‘s discriminatory collateral effects and proposed re-
fining the obscenity doctrine on that basis.  For this reason, I argued, ―with 
respect to an assessment of the obscenity doctrine‘s collateral effects, it is 
unnecessary to determine the status of the MPAA [or Google].‖45  However, 
even though as a technical matter it is unnecessary to determine whether 
collateral discriminatory effects occurred at the hands of a state actor, it 
should be noted that the actions of either Google or the MPAA might fall 
within the state action requirement‘s recognized exceptions.  Pursuant to the 
state action requirement, ―the Constitution‘s protections of individual liber-
ties and its requirement for equal protection apply only to the govern-
ment.‖46  The two recognized exceptions to the state action requirement—
the public function exception and the entanglement exception—may each 
apply to Google or the MPAA.   
The public function exception applies ―in the exercise by a private enti-
ty of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State,‖47 and the power 
to determine whether expression or conduct is obscene is a power tradition-





  See id. at 1404–11. 
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  Miramax Films Corp. v. Motion Picture Ass‘n of Am., Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d 730, 735–36 (N.Y. 
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  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.4, at 507 (3d ed. 
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which both Google and the MPAA engage—watching hours of content to 
determine whether that content is sufficiently offensive to merit censor-
ship—is strikingly similar to the practice the Court adopted in deciding Re-
drup v. New York49—namely, reversing, per curiam, convictions for the 
dissemination of materials that at least five members of the Court deemed 
to be inoffensive.50  As the Court itself later stated, the Redrup Court acted 
as an ―unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 states, subjectively 
judging each piece of material brought before [it].‖51  This likewise seems 
an apt description of the offices where Nicole Wong and her colleagues re-
view content uploaded to YouTube, or the screening rooms where members 
of the MPAA‘s ratings board determine who will see a film and who will 
not.52  Thus, if private actors conduct business previously reserved to the 
Court, a state actor, the public function exception could apply, transforming 
the otherwise private conduct into state action.53 
The second exception to the state action requirement, the entanglement 
exception, applies to actions ―authorize[d], encourage[d], or facilitate[d]‖ 
by the government, but carried out by a private actor.54  One might argue 
that the existence of the obscenity doctrine, which excludes from First 
Amendment protection material classified as obscene, indicates that the 
government authorizes, encourages, and facilitates private actors to refrain 
from disseminating obscene material.  However, the Court has ―never held 
that the mere availability of a remedy for wrongful conduct . . . so signifi-
cantly encourages the private activity as to make the State responsible for 
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distinction—as they internalize other aspects of First Amendment doctrine—so as to avoid future liabili-
ty.   
54
  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, § 6.4.4.3, at 527. 
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  Am. Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 53 (1999) (link).  
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the absence of a remedy—for example, one flowing from First Amendment 
protection of material improperly classified as obscene—so discourages 
private activity as to make the State responsible for private actions.  Still, 
one unifying theme of those decisions that do create exceptions to the state 
action requirement is the Court‘s determination that the state action ―is in-
extricably linked to the Court‘s view as to whether[,] [in a particular case,] 
there is a violation of equal protection.‖56  It is this binding feature—the 
prevention of private discrimination—that makes some sense of the confus-
ing and inconsistent set of cases involving exceptions to the state action re-
quirement.57  And this feature most certainly appears in the private conduct 
upon which my essay elaborates.58  
The line dividing state action from private action is anything but 
bright.59  Cases elaborating exceptions to the state action requirement are 
inconsistent and suggest that any action could be cast as state action if a 
court believes it should be.60  Moreover, the line between public and private 
action has been widely criticized in a number of different contexts,61 but has 
been particularly criticized when applied to the Internet domain.62  This crit-
icism results in part from the increasing popularity of the Internet as a fo-
rum for speech: 
 
As more and more speech migrates online, to blogs and so-
cial-networking sites and the like, the ultimate power to de-
cide who has an opportunity to be heard, and what we may 
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financial bailout bill), the line seems to be getting blurrier every day.  See H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. 
(2008) (link).  
60
  See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 463–64, n.2 
(2007); Robert J. Glennon Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment 
“State Action” Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221; Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incor-
rectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451 (2007).   
61
  Many scholars have argued that the state action requirement should be eliminated.  For some ca-
nonical works, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688–1719 (2d ed. 1988); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1985); Einer Richard Elhauge, 
The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667 (1991); Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading 
Search for State Action Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957). 
62
  See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 217 (1999) (―If [in the 
Internet context] code functions as law, then we are creating the most significant new jurisdiction since 
the Louisiana Purchase, yet we are building it just outside the Constitution‘s review.  Indeed, we are 
building it just so the Constitution will not govern—as if we want to be free of the constraints of value 
embedded by that tradition.‖). 
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engines and other Internet companies like Google, Yahoo, 
AOL, Facebook, and even eBay.63 
 
In a world increasingly reliant on bottom-up rather than top-down or-
dering where media distributors and Internet service providers control the 
flow of expressive content, it has been private actors that have, for some 
time, made the determination of whether content falls into the unprotected 
category of obscenity.64   
B. Requisite First Steps 
Because the obscenity doctrine has largely fallen into disuse, the ex-
amples I engaged with in my essay did not derive from judicial opinions.65  
Taking a cue from scholars like Ryan Goodman, I sought to ―examine not 
only the instrumental, or direct, impact of laws . . . but also the indirect or 
collateral effects . . . laws have . . . .‖66  The examination of law‘s collateral 
effects is an outgrowth of the ―explosion of scholarly interest in norms,‖67 
which examines law‘s ―ability to influence individual behavior by an exis-
tence decoupled from its enforcement.‖68  Because the obscenity doctrine 
has not been enforced in recent years, I examined the indirect effects the 
doctrine might have.  And while scholarly interest in norms extends beyond 
the First Amendment, a scholarly examination of norms in that context is 
particularly worthwhile for at least two reasons.   
First, as I argued in my essay, examining the collateral effects of the 
First Amendment‘s boundaries helps to illuminate both patent and latent si-





  Rosen, supra note 24. 
64
  I do not mean to suggest that the nature of the Internet and film media contexts—each interme-
diated by filtering bodies like search engines and a ratings board that exercises discretion in filtering 
content to end-users—itself violates First Amendment principles.  I mean to argue instead that because 
the obscenity doctrine has failed to disaggregate sex from sexual orientation, these filtering intermedia-
ries have acted reasonably when filtering homosexual content more readily than equally suggestive hete-
rosexual content.  As a result, my argument addresses principally not the intermediaries themselves but 
courts with the ability to refine the doctrine with which these intermediaries reasonably aim to comply.  
Cf. Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet As an Unintermediated Experience, 
(Inst. for Law & Econ. Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Research Paper No. 09-33, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1475382 (arguing that intermediaries‘ exercise of 
editorial discretion can promote rather than inhibit free speech values) (link).   
65
  It should be noted that even if one argues that the obscenity doctrine has not fallen into disuse, an 
examination of the ways in which major media filters have internalized constitutional norms by censor-
ing content perceived to be obscene can still be useful because these private filtering entities have very 
powerful control over content that is publicly disseminated.  
66
  Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Pa-
noptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643, 645 (2001).  
67
  Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 542 
(1998).  
68
  Glazer, supra note 1, at 1384.  
69
  Id. at 1403.   
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Second, examining the collateral effects of the obscenity doctrine, or of any 
First Amendment doctrine, is warranted and useful because Google, the 
MPAA, and other companies who filter and disseminate expressive content 
to ordinary end-users incorporate into their practices and policies the sub-
stance of First Amendment doctrine.  For example, YouTube‘s Community 
Guidelines, incorporated by reference into YouTube‘s Terms of Service,70 
explain that while YouTube ―encourage[s] free speech and defend[s] every-
one‘s right to express unpopular points of view,‖ it ―is not for pornography 
or sexually explicit content,‖ and doesn‘t ―permit hate speech‖ (which, it 
should be noted, includes speech that ―attacks or demeans a group based 
on‖ identity categories like race, religion, disability, and ―sexual orienta-
tion/gender identity‖).71  So that YouTube can ensure that it avoids liability 
for disseminating content that falls into the First Amendment‘s categories 
of unprotected speech, it allows users to upload the sort of speech that the 
First Amendment protects—speech that does not fall into delineated ―low-
value speech‖ categories and that expresses differing points of view—and 
does not allow users to upload speech that maps onto the surviving catego-
ries of unprotected, low-value speech—obscenity and hate speech.72  Thus, 
an examination of the companies that determine which types of expression 
will be exposed to end-users seems a useful one when trying to determine 
law‘s collateral effects. 
Professor McDonald criticizes the statistical data on the actions of 
Google and the MPAA that I offered in my essay.  In the case of Google, 
this was based on the quantity of my data,73 and in the case of the MPAA, 
on their alleged generality.74  As a threshold matter, I should note that my 
essay disclaimed that the data would be able to ―demonstrate the sorts of 
statistical disparities that a showing of disparate impact [against gays and 
lesbians] might require.‖75  My purpose in offering data was to demonstrate 





  YouTube, YouTube Terms of Service § 1.A, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Nov. 
1, 2009) (link). 
71
  YouTube, YouTube Community Guidelines, http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2009) (link).  
72
  As I argued in my essay, obscenity is arguably the only surviving category of low value speech of 
the categories listed by the Chaplinsky Court.  Glazer, supra note 1, at 1388.  Cf. Posting of Eugene Vo-
lokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://www.volokh.com/posts/1212872018.shtml (Jun. 7, 2008, 16:53 
EST) (―‗Hate speech‘ is not a legal term of art under U.S. law, nor an exception from First Amendment 
protection.  Some of what some label as ‗hate speech‘ may, depending on the circumstances, fall within 
the generally quite narrow exceptions for fighting words, threats, incitement, or certain kinds of false 
statements of fact.‖) (link).   
73
  See McDonald, supra note 4, at 480–81.  
74
  See id. at 480.  
75
  Glazer, supra note 1, at 1403.  
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and lesbian sex.  After all, discrimination is difficult to demonstrate conclu-
sively and is often carefully disguised.76   
Moreover, I collected the preliminary data that I analyzed in my essay 
with the purpose of determining what content end-users do and do not re-
ceive.  The information collected and described in the essay came from two 
sources: (1) Searches generated through Google; and (2) Kirby Dick‘s do-
cumentary film This Film is Not Yet Rated, which exposed the MPAA for a 
number of questionable practices, including but not limited to its differing 
treatment of homosexual and heterosexual sex.  The reason that I chose to 
study the filtering processes of Google and the MPAA was that these enti-
ties have nearly sovereign discretion over the content that ordinary individ-
uals can access, and because these giant filtering entities perform the same 
kind of function that was once performed by courts when obscenity cases 
appeared on their dockets.  In addition, in assessing the collateral effects of 
First Amendment doctrine, the end-user who does or does not receive con-
tent is the relevant individual about whom data should be collected—the 
First Amendment‘s concern is that speech be accessible to the individual.77  
As a result, when gathering preliminary data on Google and the MPAA, I 
endeavored to collect data that would have an impact on what content end-
users would and would not receive.   
McDonald criticizes the Google search results described in my essay 
for being too few.  When collecting results from Google, I tried to act as the 
typical Google end-user, which is why I reported only on the first page of 
results.  I performed Google searches for ―having sex‖ under each of 
Google‘s ―strict,‖ ―moderate,‖ and no filtering options, and analyzed the 
first twenty results generated by this search.  McDonald is puzzled by my 
essay‘s ―silence on what all of [the] search results returned (and not just the 
first twenty).‖78  The first twenty results of a Google search appear on the 
search‘s first page of results.  Appearing on any other page of results is said 
to ensure inexistence and invisibility.  The ―all-important first page‖79 of 





  See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1419–22; Paulette M. Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Ef-
fects of Standard Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 555, 572 (1985).  Cf. Adam B. Cox 
& Thomas J. Miles, Documenting Discrimination?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31 (2008), 
http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/108/31_CoxMiles.pdf (arguing that data indicating 
the rate of plaintiff success in published voting rights cases cannot demonstrate the frequency of voting 
rights discrimination against minorities in certain parts of the country) (link).  
77
  Any of the classic purposes for the First Amendment‘s protection of freedom of expression—for 
example, self-governance, the discovery of truth, the advancement of autonomy, or the promotion of to-
lerance—is predicated upon an individual‘s ability to send and receive expressive messages.  For a more 
elaborate discussion of each of the First Amendment‘s classic purposes, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
46, § 11.1.2, at 924–30.   
78
  McDonald, supra note 4, at 77–78. 
79
  Susan Kinzie & Ellen Nakashima, Calling in Pros to Refine Your Google Image, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, July 2, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/07/01/AR2007070101355.html (link). 
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―[y]ou don‘t exist from Page 3 on.‖80  Some studies have made even strong-
er claims, showing that ―precious few sleuths go beyond the first page of 
search results.‖81  According to Danny Sullivan, editor of Search Engine 
Watch, ―If [a search result] is not on the first page, it might as well be invis-
ible.‖82  My analysis of the first page of Google results was not intended to 
exclude results for the sake of generating impressive statistics, but instead 
to include only that information that Google‘s users are likely to view.   
McDonald criticizes as ―general comparisons‖83 the quite detailed de-
scriptions of scenes in films rated differently as a result of the homosexual 
content in those scenes.  While in my essay I conceded that a film is rated 
as a whole rather than scene-by-scene, Mr. Dick‘s documentary includes in-
terviews with filmmakers who state that the MPAA communicated to them 
that the particular scenes described posed barriers to earning a rating of ―R‖ 
as opposed to a rating of ―NC-17.‖84  And, as would be expected, the scenes 
depicted in films rated ―R‖ and ―NC-17‖ were the most explicit scenes in 
those films.  But what is, perhaps, most telling is that in the aftermath of the 
documentary‘s release, the MPAA changed those practices that Mr. Dick 
criticized.85 
III. IN LIGHT OF LAWRENCE 
Perhaps because of the doctrine‘s relative disuse, the Miller obscenity 
test has remained unchanged since its original formulation.  However, since 
Miller was decided in 1973, and specifically since the Supreme Court de-
cided Lawrence v. Texas in 2003,86 attitudes toward gays and lesbians have 
changed considerably.  In my essay, I argued that the obscenity doctrine 
should be refined in light of Lawrence, whether read broadly87 or narrow-





  Sara Kehaulauni Goo, For Ted Leonsis, a Quest to Find Himself Faster Online, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Nov. 13, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/12/AR2006111200804.html (link).  
81
  Tom Zeller Jr., Gaming the Search Engine, in a Political Season, NYTIMES.COM, Nov. 6, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/06/business/media/06link.html (link).  
82
  Id. 
83
  McDonald, supra note 4, at 77. 
84
  See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1407 (―For example, a scene in which Hilary Swank performed oral 
sex on Chloë Sevigny had to be cut because Ms. Sevigny‘s orgasm was, according to the MPAA raters, 
too long.‖).  
85
  See Shen Shi‘an, “This Film is Not Yet Rated” for Sex & Violence?, THE BUDDHIST CHANNEL, 
Jan. 30, 2008, http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/index.php?id=12,5848,0,0,1,0 (link).  
86
  539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
87
  See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1415–17 (explaining that the spatial, liberal, moral, and cultural di-
mensions of the majority opinion in Lawrence can be read broadly to incorporate the decision‘s underly-
ing equality principle, which mandates that gays and lesbians should be given equal rights to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness).   
88
  See id. at 1417–18 (explaining that the majority opinion in Lawrence opinion can be read narrow-
ly to protect the right to adult consensual sex in the privacy of one‘s own home).  
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guish sex from sexual orientation violates Lawrence‘s ―equality prin-
ciple.‖89  Even Lawrence‘s narrowest interpretation—limiting Lawrence to 
its plain words—would provide reason to refine the obscenity doctrine, 
however, because the test discriminates against expressive content on the 
basis of either its subject matter or its viewpoint.  
Professor McDonald lodges two objections to my essay‘s use of the 
Lawrence decision.  First, he makes a technical argument that ―[i]f per-
ceived tensions between Lawrence and Miller were put squarely to the 
Court, it might choose the former as [the doctrine] requiring modification 
rather than the latter (versus the other way around, as Glazer would have 
it).‖90  Second, McDonald advises that ―[i]nstead of arguing that obscenity 
discrimination against gay sex portrayals would constitute impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination pursuant to changes wrought by Lawrence, Glazer 
would do better to rest her argument squarely on the content discrimination 
principles‖ that have formed the core of McDonald‘s other writings.91 
Before addressing each of McDonald‘s objections in Part III below, I 
want to first reiterate the original motivation for incorporating into my es-
say an analysis of the Lawrence decision.  Lawrence has not been applied in 
the wide array of contexts that some commentators have suggested that it 
ought to be.92  In a recent obscenity case (one of the few), in fact, the Third 
Circuit not only refused to extend the holding in Lawrence, but also de-
clared that the implications of Lawrence on morals-based legislation were 
―analytically irrelevant to the disposition of th[e] case.‖93  This declaration 
of analytical irrelevance between Lawrence and the obscenity doctrine mo-
tivated my essay.94  Despite the initial motivation for my essay, which is 
rooted in the Lawrence decision, the argument that Lawrence should not 
cause a change in the obscenity doctrine is one with which I take less issue 
than my original essay might suggest.  For this reason I argued not that the 
obscenity doctrine should be refined because of Lawrence (as McDonald 





  Id. at 1416 & n.247 (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the 
Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1053–54 (2005)).  
90
  McDonald, supra note 4, at 74.   
91
  Id. at 80.  
92
  See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1411 n.211 (citing a number of articles in which scholars have pre-
scribed applying Lawrence in a variety of legal contexts).  Its holding has, however, been extended to 
some contexts.  Cf. id. at 1415 n.238 (citing lower court cases applying the holding in Lawrence). 
93
  U.S. v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 159 n.12 (3d Cir. 2005) (link), cert denied 547 U.S. 
1143 (2006).  A Texas court of appeals also rejected a Lawrence-based constitutional challenge to the 
application of the Texas obscenity statute to the sale of obscene content to consenting adults in a retail 
establishment that bars minors‘ entry.  See Ex Parte Valeria Joyce Dave, 220 S.W.3d 154, 158–59 (Tex. 
App. 2007) (link), cert denied sub nom. Dave v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 628 (2007).  Both Extreme Associates 
and Ex Parte Valeria Joyce Dave have been denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court, which sug-
gests that the Court will not decide what, if any, impact Lawrence has on the obscenity doctrine. 
94
  See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1382. 
95
  See McDonald, supra note 4, at 79–80.  
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light of Lawrence.‖96  This is an argument to which Professor McDonald 
has signed on, assuming that the doctrine could be shown to discriminate 
against homosexual content in a court of law.97  The fact that I argued that 
the obscenity doctrine should be refined in light of Lawrence undermines 
both of McDonald‘s Lawrence-based objections.  
A. Contextualizing Miller and Lawrence 
McDonald has made the technical argument that if the Court‘s decision 
in a later case, like Lawrence, is thought to conflict with the Court‘s deci-
sion in an earlier case, like Miller, the Court is as free to overrule the later 
decision as it is to overrule the earlier.98  No ―last-in-time rule‖ applies to 
judicial precedent, and the Court could overrule any of its prior decisions.99  
While correct as a technical matter, this argument is incorrect as a practical 
matter.  In arguing that the obscenity doctrine should be refined in light of 
Lawrence, I meant to incorporate into my argument the contexts in which 
the obscenity doctrine was formulated, in which Lawrence was decided, 
and in which both Miller and Lawrence have remained good law.   
First, the idea that Lawrence might be modified in light of Miller can 
be dismissed as a threshold matter; both times the Court has been faced 
with cases that highlighted the tensions between Lawrence and Miller, it 
has denied certiorari.  However, McDonald‘s argument deserves to be ana-
lyzed by setting aside the likelihood that the Court will address the impact 
of Lawrence on Miller (or, for that matter, of Miller on Lawrence) any time 
soon, if ever.   
Second, the Court is unlikely to modify Lawrence in light of Miller be-
cause since Lawrence was decided, public support for gays and lesbians has 
increased dramatically.  In addition to legal commentary dubbing Lawrence 
one of the Court‘s landmark decisions,100 a poll in the Washington Post re-
ported that more respondents support same-sex marriage than oppose it, 
with a split of 49% of respondents in favor and 46% opposed.101  While this 





  Glazer, supra note 1, at 1382, 1419.   
97
  See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.  
98
  See McDonald, supra note 4, at 74. 
99
  I borrow the concept of a ―last-in-time rule‖ from the international law context, where it is a well-
settled rule that Congress has the authority to override treaties for purposes of U.S. law.  Pursuant to the 
rule, if a federal statute is enacted after a treaty has been ratified, ―the statute is ‗the latest expression of 
the sovereign will.‘‖  Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva 
Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT‘L L. 322, 339 (2007) (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 
(1888)).   
100
  See Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1399, 1399 n.2 (2004).  
101
  See Jennifer Agiesta & Alec MacGillis, Poll: Rising U.S. Support for Social Issues, Such as Gay 
Marriage, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/30/AR2009043001640.html?hpid=topnews (link).  
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crease from the same poll taken in 2006, when only 36% of respondents fa-
vored same-sex marriage and 58% opposed it.102  Professor Sonja Starr con-
tends that because ―the composition of the population hasn‘t changed fast 
enough to explain shifts of this magnitude in a few years,‖ it must be ―that a 
lot of people, young and old, have changed their minds.‖103  For Starr, court 
decisions play a big role in causing a shift in people‘s attitudes, whether ―by 
direct persuasion, by starting a statewide or nationwide conversation that 
gets people to question traditions, or simply by allowing gay and lesbian 
couples to marry (which could shape public opinion as people realize that 
fears about the effects on marriage as a social institution have not panned 
out).‖104  Currently, as a result of court decisions and enacted laws, same-
sex couples can marry in five states105: Connecticut,106 Iowa,107 Massachu-
setts,108 New Hampshire,109 and Vermont.110  Other states offer same-sex 
couples some benefits of marriage but do not allow same-sex couples to 
marry.111  Though equal rights for gays and lesbians are not synonymous 
with equal marriage rights, the fight for marriage equality has been a top 
priority for gay rights activists for some time and a leading bone of conten-
tion between supporters and detractors of gay rights.  It therefore seems rea-
sonable to gauge public support for gays and lesbians by reference to public 
support for same-sex marriage.  And while evidence from polls, court deci-
sions, and legislative action in a handful of states does not mean that atti-





  Id.   
103
  Posting of Sonja Star to Concurring Opinions, Public Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/04/public_opinion.htm (April 30, 2009, 14:07 EST) 
(link). 
104
  Id. 
105
  Until very recently, same-sex couples could marry in six states, but voters in Maine repealed the 
state‘s same-sex marriage law.  See Posting to CruzLines, Marriage Equality Defeated (for now) in 
Maine, http://mylaw.usc.edu/blogCruz/1/2009/11/Marriage-Equality-Defeated-for-now-in-Maine.cfm 
(Nov. 4, 2009, 7:33 PST) (link).    
106
  See Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that the state statu-
tory prohibition against same-sex marriage impermissibly discriminated against gay people on account 
of their sexual orientation in violation of the Connecticut constitution) (link).  
107
  See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding that a provision in the Iowa Code 
prohibiting same-sex marriages was unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause of 
the Iowa constitution) (link).  
108
  See Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the Massa-
chusetts marriage licensing statute, which did not permit same-sex couples to marry, violated the protec-
tions of individual liberty and equality in the Massachusetts constitution) (link).   
109
  See Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, NYTIMES.COM, Jun. 3, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/04marriage.html (link).  
110
  See Keith B. Richburg, Vermont Legislature Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/07/AR2009040701663.html  (link).    
111
  For an overview of states‘ recognition of same-sex relationships, see Lambda Legal, Status of 
Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/articles/nationwide-
status-same-sex-relationships.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009) (link). 
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the public accepts homosexuality to a larger degree than in the past.  One 
might argue that because public opinion of gays and lesbians is increasingly 
positive, the obscenity doctrine need not specify that homosexual identity is 
not obscene.  It is at least arguable, however, that public opinion has begun 
to increase only after cases and laws, like those related to the legalization of 
same-sex marriage, have made legal constitutive aspects of gay and lesbian 
identity (such as coupling with a member of the same sex, as in the case of 
same-sex marriage, or depicting the copulation between same-sex couples, 
as in the case of obscenity).  
A third reason that the Court is unlikely to modify Lawrence in light of 
Miller is that the obscenity doctrine‘s very roots—its earliest cases, and 
Miller in particular—involved material whose content included a lot of ho-
mosexual sex.112  Currently, however, the Miller test makes no distinction 
between content determined to be obscene because it depicts gay sex and 
content determined to be obscene because it is patently offensive.  Because 
the obscenity doctrine does not disaggregate sex from sexual orientation,113 
purveyors of material classified as obscene due to the material‘s homosex-
ual content are unable to argue against such a classification.  Thus, the ob-
scenity of gays‘ and lesbians‘ identity has ―informed the construction of the 
obscenity doctrine itself.‖114  But even though the doctrine was constructed 
in response to materials depicting homosexual sex, it was nonetheless con-
structed so as to guide the obscenity determination away from one based on 
the subjectivity of judges—a purpose arguably not achieved in a post-
Lawrence world.  After all, the Miller test was constructed in order to help 
judges and juries disaggregate what about a work was truly offensive.  But 
because the test fails to disaggregate sex from sexual orientation, a work 
that is classified as obscene because of its homosexual content is as doctri-
nally acceptable as a work that is classified as obscene because it is espe-
cially graphic.   
B. Viewpoint Discrimination 
As I explained in my essay, discrimination claims can derive not only 
from the Equal Protection Clause, but also from the First Amendment itself.  





  Glazer, supra note 1, at 1399–1400.  This is, as a result of the reasonable strategy that a prosecu-
tion is likely to adopt in bringing an obscenity lawsuit, unsurprising.  See supra notes 20–21 and accom-
panying text.  When the government focused on censoring pornography, it focused on censoring 
―pornography outside of the mainstream: gay male pornography, true lesbian pornography, transsexual 
pornography, depictions of interracial sex, and so forth.‖  PAUL R. ABRAMSON & STEVEN D. 
PINKERTON, WITH PLEASURE: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 184 (1995).     
113
  I borrow the move to disaggregate sex from sexual orientation from Professor Mary Anne 
Case‘s landmark piece about employment discrimination on the basis of gender-stereotyping.  See Mary 
Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the 
Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995).  
114
  Glazer, supra note 1, at 1385.  
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criminate against particular viewpoints and, to a lesser extent, laws that dis-
criminate against particular subject matters.115  In my essay, I argued that 
even the narrowest reading of Lawrence can support an argument that the 
obscenity doctrine violates the First Amendment because it discriminates on 
the basis of viewpoint.  Professor McDonald has urged me to reconsider 
this argument in favor of an argument based simply on the principles of 
content discrimination that McDonald has written about in the past.116  
McDonald argues that ―[s]mut is smut, and in terms of obscenity-related 
harms the government can legitimately seek to address, it appears to make 
little difference whether such materials involve heterosexual or same-sex 
actors.‖117  
The ―obscenity-related harms the government can legitimately seek to 
address‖ are, for McDonald, ―reasons [that] have to do with the low ‗truth‘ 
value of extreme pornographic material and its potential harm to societal in-
terests in shielding youths, adults, and the greater community from conduct 
and materials that threaten society‘s interests in preserving minimum levels 
of decency and morality.‖118  McDonald answers, in my opinion correctly, 
that homosexual sex does not implicate the low truth value or potential 
harm of obscene material any differently than heterosexual sex.  Thus, 
McDonald and I agree that obscenity containing homosexual sex is of no 
lesser First Amendment value than obscenity containing heterosexual sex.  
However, McDonald argues that as a result of the equally low truth value or 
equally high harm value of depictions of homosexual and heterosexual sex, 
a court demonstrating a bias against homosexual content when making an 
obscenity determination would only violate principles of content discrimi-
nation.  But McDonald‘s argument that ―[s]mut is smut‖—that depictions of 
heterosexual and homosexual sex have equal First Amendment value—
indicates that he should object to the obscenity doctrine‘s second level of 
content discrimination, as well. 
I agree with McDonald that such a determination would violate prin-
ciples of content discrimination, but I argue further that it would specifical-
ly violate the prohibition against ―second-level‖119 content discrimination 
articulated by the Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.120  The fact that the ob-
scenity test, by its own terms, invites a second level of content discrimina-
tion does not mean that adjudicators at this second level should be able to 
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issue that the obscenity doctrine, in its current formulation, cannot disag-
gregate.  If a work is indeed ―smut,‖ then McDonald and I agree that it 
should be classified as obscenity.  But the fact that McDonald and I also 
agree that homosexual smut and heterosexual smut equally implicate the 
truth value of speech protected by the First Amendment does not mean that 
the obscenity doctrine is equipped to determine whether homosexual smut 
and heterosexual smut are actually valued equally.  It is this additional 
weighing function that I propose the obscenity doctrine should be able to 
perform. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In When Obscenity Discriminates, I argued that the First Amendment‘s 
obscenity doctrine has generated discriminatory collateral effects against 
gays and lesbians.  I analyzed possible biases against gay and lesbian con-
tent by private actors with undeniable power and authority to filter content 
through some of the most popular media through which content is dissemi-
nated.  I argued that in light of the Lawrence decision, the doctrine‘s dis-
criminatory collateral effects are unconstitutional on both equal protection 
and First Amendment grounds.  In this Reply, I respond to Professor Barry 
McDonald‘s objections and explain further the analysis in my essay.  Ulti-
mately, both pieces reach the same conclusion: the obscenity doctrine 
should be refined in light of Lawrence.   
McDonald would propose to refine the obscenity doctrine only on the 
condition that the doctrine is shown to discriminate against content solely 
because of its homosexual nature in a court of law.  I propose to refine the 
obscenity doctrine earlier, before the conditions that McDonald would re-
quire are satisfied.  While my proposal may seem hasty, achieving transpa-
rency in the doctrine is important because of the ways in which the 
obscenity doctrine‘s effect is measured and because of the impact of the 
Lawrence decision.  Achieving transparency requires that the doctrine diffe-
rentiate between sex and sexual orientation.  Under the current doctrine, a 
determination that content is obscene because it contains homosexual sex is 
not one that the doctrine would prohibit.  
Moreover, the refinement I suggest is quite modest for at least three 
reasons.  First, unlike anti-discrimination efforts in the contexts of marriage 
or employment discrimination, my proposal does not require any change in 





  To the extent that my discussion in Part II.A appears to propose a change in the law, I wish to 
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builds on successes in other arenas in which gays and lesbians have expe-
rienced discrimination by protecting, as free speech, portrayals of conduct 
now protected.  Third, my clarification is consonant with the original pur-
pose of the obscenity test: namely, to replace intuitive individual reactions 
with a more objective standard.  A doctrine based entirely upon intuition 
does not help future judges or juries determine what differentiates protected 
expression from unprotected obscenity.  Although knowing obscenity when 
one sees it may not offer much in the way of doctrinal guidance, Justice 
Stewart‘s infamous insight does highlight an underlying truth about obscen-
ity—in order to know whether expression constitutes obscenity, one must 
be able to see it.  And seeing obscenity depends upon knowing what to look 
for. 
                                                                                                                           
absolute control over the filtering of expressive content, private actors who adopt as their own rules the 
rules that courts have made in obscenity cases.   
